Abstract: Although both domestic and foreign private banks have gained ground in Middle East and North Africa (MENA) in recent years, state banks continue to play an important role in many countries. Using a MENA bank-level panel dataset for the period 2001-2008, the article contributes to the empirical literature on bank ownership and performance by documenting recent ownership trends and assessing the relations between bank ownership and performance in MENA while accounting for key bank characteristics such as size and balance sheet composition. The article is the first to analyze headline performance indicators as well as their key drivers and finds that state banks exhibit significantly weaker performance, despite their larger size and potential scale economies. This result is mainly driven by larger holdings of government securities, higher costs due to larger staffing, and larger loan-loss provisions reflecting weaker asset quality. These results seem to reflect both operational inefficiencies and policy mandates. Taken together, the results do not reject the development role of state banks, but show that their policy interventions come at a cost. As such, the article argues that there is scope to reduce the share of state banks in some MENA countries and to clarify the mandates, improve the governance, and strengthen the operational efficiency of most state banks in the region.
Introduction
The last three decades witnessed a sharp reduction in the role of state-owned banks (state banks for short) in most emerging countries. The share of state banks in total bank assets declined significantly in most regions during this period ( Figure 1 ). This decline in market shares was dramatic in the Eastern Europe and Central Asian region, reflecting the transition from communism in the 1990s, but was also impressive in the other regions. Today state banks account on average for less than 50% of bank assets in most emerging regions, implying that private banks lead financial intermediation in most countries.
This reduction in the role of state banks reflects a general disappointment with their financial performance and contribution to financial and economic development, especially in the countries where they dominated the banking system. In many countries, it also reflects a reaction to the large fiscal costs associated with their restructuring. However, despite their loss of market share, state banks still play a substantive role in many regions, especially in East Asia, the Middle East and North Africa, and South Asia (Figure 1 ). In some countries, state banks still lead the process of financial intermediation, with market shares above 50% of total system assets. In most other countries, state banks do not lead financial intermediation any longer, but still retain an important role, with market shares varying between 20 and 50%. In general, state banks only seem to play a negligible role in Eastern Europe and Africa.
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Figure 1: Share of state banks in total assets (%), . State banks are defined as banks in which the government is a majority shareholder. Regional shares are calculated as simple country averages of the share of majority government-owned bank assets to total system assets. Source: Levy-Yeyati, . 2010 numbers are based on author's calculations. Data for MENA is from Bankscope and for other regions is from Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2008) . MENA countries include Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia, and Yemen.
1 See Clarke, Cull, and Megginson (2005) and Levy-Yeyati, Micco, and Panizza (2007) . 2 The Eastern Europe and Central Asian region is very diverse in this regard. The average market share of state banks is generally negligible in the first group but still large in the second group.
The arguments that have been put forward to justify the continuing presence of state banks are well known. State banks may address market failures resulting from asymmetric information and poor enforcement of contracts that ultimately restrict access to credit by enterprises and individuals. Moreover, they may also provide essential financial services in remote areas, where access to finance is constrained by large fixed costs. Furthermore, state banks can also play an important countercyclical role, helping prevent an excessive contraction of credit during a financial crisis. This latter argument is not new, but has been reinforced by the recent global financial crisis. 3 These arguments may justify policy interventions in many countries, although it does not necessarily follow that state banks are the optimal type of intervention. For example, well-designed credit guarantee schemes may address information asymmetries more effectively (by preserving the leadership role of private banks) and may also play a countercyclical role. Moreover, even in the cases where the presence of state banks may be justified, policy-makers still face the challenge of ensuring clear mandates and sound governance structures in order to minimize political interference and avoid credit misallocation and large financial losses -not a trivial task in most countries. Therefore, the decision of whether state banks should continue playing a role in the financial system entails a careful consideration of benefits and costs. In making this decision, policy-makers should take into account many factors, including the past performance and contribution of state banks in their countries and elsewhere.
The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is one of the regions where state banks have lost market share but still play an important role in many countries. In the aftermath of the recent global financial crisis, policy-makers in these countries have been considering whether they should reduce further the role of these banks. Therefore, an analysis of the performance of state banks in the MENA region can provide useful inputs to this decision. This is precisely the main objective of this article. We examine the trends in the structures of MENA banking systems, assess the performance of state and private banks (domestic and foreign) at the bank level in the period [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] , and assess whether possible differences in performance could be related to policy mandates. Although not the main objective of the article, we also examine the association between the listing of banks and their performance. We conduct this additional analysis, not only because it has merit on its own but also because the listing of state banks is one of the measures that could arguably affect their performance. We diminish omitted variable bias by controlling for bank size, balance sheet structures, country-fixed effects, and other variables.
As a preview to our empirical results, we find that state banks have significantly weaker performance along various dimensions, despite their larger size and the associated benefits of scale economies. We find that this result is driven by more prominent investment in often lower yielding government securities, higher staff expenditures, and larger loan-loss provisions which reflect poorer asset quality. These findings point to significant operational inefficiencies of state banks in MENA. Moreover, the article also examines some evidence that the weaker performance of state banks cannot be justified by policy mandates such as the supply of banking services in remote areas, provision of finance to underserved segments such as SMEs, or countercyclical credit provision during periods of financial stress.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. The second section reviews the empirical literature on bank ownership and performance. The third section examines recent trends in the structure of banking systems in MENA, with focus on ownership patterns. The fourth section provides a description of the dataset. The fifth section discusses the results from statistical analysis. The sixth section discusses whether the performance of state banks in MENA could be explained and justified by the policy mandates imposed on these institutions. Finally, the seventh and last section summarizes the main findings and identifies the main policy implications.
2 Review of the empirical literature on bank ownership and performance
The empirical literature on bank ownership and performance can be divided into three broad groups. The first group examines the financial performance of individual banks controlling for ownership and other bank-level characteristics, such as size and balance sheet structures. The second group of empirical studies examines whether state banks contribute positively to financial development and economic growth, a more ambitious and challenging objective. The third group of studies examines the interactions between the actions of state banks and the political cycle, to assess the degree of political interference on these institutions.
One of the main objectives of the first group of studies is to assess whether bank ownership affects performance, as measured by profits, margins, costs, and the quality of loan portfolios. For example, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2000) focus on foreign ownership and find that foreign banks generate higher interest margins and profits, especially in developing countries. Micco, Panizza, and Yañez (2004) provide a comprehensive analysis of bank ownership and performance and conclude that state banks in developing countries tend to have lower profits, higher costs, and larger non-performing loans (NPLs) relative to private banks. Foreign banks on the other hand are more profitable and have lower costs.
However, in both this study and a subsequent study (Levy-Yeyati, Micco and Panizza 2007) , the authors caution against drawing immediate conclusions from the weak financial performance of state banks, as it may reflect not only extensive political interference (e.g. in lending and employment decisions) and operational inefficiencies but also their development mandates. Moreover, the authors do not find a strong correlation between bank ownership and financial performance in industrial countries, suggesting that state banks in these countries have been able to operate with clearer mandates and sounder governance structures.
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The second line of empirical research is best exemplified by the influential study by La Porta, López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2002) . In this article, the authors show that higher government ownership of banks is associated with slower subsequent financial development and GDP growth. Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2006) find similar results in a study focused on banking regulation. However, Levy-Yeyati, Micco, and Panizza (2007) revisit La Porta, López-deSilanes, and Shleifer (2002) by using more recent data, better estimation techniques, and additional controls and show that the evidence that state bank prevalence lead to lower growth and financial development is not strong. Two recent articles (Korner and Schnabel 2010; Andrianova, Demetriades, and Shortland 2010) reach similar conclusions. They find a negative relationship between a high fraction of public ownership in the banking system and growth when financial development and the quality of political institutions are low, conditions that tend to prevail in developing countries. However, similar to Levy-Yeyati, , they do not find a negative impact of public ownership and growth in developed countries. They stress that the quality of institutions and governance are important in studying the impact of public ownership on growth.
The third group of studies examines the interactions between credit decisions of state banks and the political cycle. Dinc (2005) uses a large crosscountry sample and finds that in election years the pace of credit from private banks slows, while the growth of credit from state banks remains constant. Cole (2008) finds in the case of India that lending by state banks increases in election years. Khwaja and Mian (2005) show that in Pakistan politically-connected firms borrow more from state banks and have higher default rates. Sapienza (2004) shows that Italian state banks charge lower interest rates in the provinces where the party of the bank's chairman is stronger. In the same line, Micco, Panizza, and Yañez (2007) find that state financial institutions have lower profitability and higher costs than commercial banks and that the gap widens during election years.
All in all, these studies suggest that while there may be a development role for state banks in developing countries, state banks also have to operate under a more hostile institutional environment in these countries. Extensive political interference in credit and employment decisions, blurred mandates, poor governance structures, and severe operational deficiencies may eventually outweigh the potential for these banks to address their development mandates and contribute to financial and economic progress. Overcoming these institutional weaknesses and ensuring a supportive environment for state banks is not a trivial task in many developing countries.
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Our study contributes to the literature in various ways. First, we employ a novel time-varying bank ownership database. This database has been constructed through consultations with the Union of Arab Banks, web searches, and interactions with World Bank economists. Second, there is limited research on bank ownership and performance focused on the MENA region. Most studies have a country focus rather than a regional focus (e.g. Omran (2007) and Mohieldin and Nasr (2007) for Egypt , Isik, Gunduz, and Omran (2004) for Jordan, Bennaceur and Goaied (2001) for Tunisia, and Turk-Ariss (2008) for Lebanon). Third, unlike ours, the studies with a regional focus tend to stress specific aspects such as economies of scale (Olson and Zoubi 2010) or institutional aspects such as Islamic banking (e.g. Sufian, Mohamad, and MuhamedZulkhibri 2008; Ben Khediri and Ben-Khediri 2009) . The study by Kobeissi and Sun (2010) is possibly the only exception in this regard. The authors analyze the impact of ownership structure on bank performance in 17 MENA countries and find that private banks perform better than state banks, as measured by higher returns on assets and equity. They also find that the presence of foreign banks seems to have a positive impact on the performance of local banks. Moreover, banks listed in the stock market are also found to have higher performance rates.
Our study is closest to the one by Kobeissi and Sun (2010) in some methodological aspects, but has some important differences. First, the samples are not identical -while Kobeissi and Sun (2010) adopt a broad definition of MENA that includes Iran, Israel, Mauritania, and Turkey, we not only exclude these countries but also focus the statistical analysis in Section 5 on the non-GCC countries. We focus on the non-GCC countries, because the distinctions between public and private ownership are more relevant and consequential in these countries. Second, Kobeissi and Sun only focus on measures of profitability, while we explore other measures of performance and make an attempt to explain the differences between the profitability of state and private banks from its main determinants, i.e. margins, costs, employment, wages, and loan-loss provisions.
3 Major trends in bank ownership in the MENA region
As shown in Figure 2 and Table 1 , the overall market share of state banks in MENA declined only moderately in the past decade, from 41% of total assets in 2001 to 34% in 2010. However, this outcome was essentially due to the stable average share of state banks in the GCC countries -around 28% of total bank assets during most of this period and slightly higher in 2010. By contrast, the average market share of state banks in the non-GCC countries declined significantly -from 56 to 39% of total assets in the same period. Within the non-GCC region, two groups of countries can be identified. In the first group, state banks play a dominant role (Algeria, Libya, and Syria), while in the second group private banks lead financial intermediation (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia, and Yemen). As shown in Figure 2 , the average market share of state banks declined in the two groups, but this decline took place from very different initial positions. In the first group, state banks still dominate financial intermediation despite their loss of market share (84% in 2010), while in the second group, private banks have generally consolidated their leadership position (73% in 2010).
Bank Ownership and Performance in the MENA Region These averages provide a very useful overview of the overall trends in MENA, but they also mask important differences across individual countries. As shown in Figure 3 , most MENA countries experienced a decline in the share of state banks during the decade, but the differences across countries are significant. The role of state banks is already modest or negligible in one set of countries, including Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, and Oman. On the other extreme, state banks still dominate financial intermediation in Algeria, Libya, and Syria, as noted above. However, it is interesting to note that Syria has made more progress in reducing the share of state banks in recent years through the entry of new private banks (there has been no major privatization until now), although state banks still play a dominant role with a market share of 67% of total assets. There is also an intermediate group of countries where the market share of state banks declined to 50% of total assets or lower levels, but still remains significant. In these countries, state banks do not lead the process of financial intermediation any longer but have still retained an important role. These countries include Egypt, Qatar, Tunisia, and Morocco. Note that Egypt is included in this group because of recent financial sector reforms that have reduced the market share of state banks to about 50% of total assets. 6 The UAE is an exception in MENA and the GCC, as the share of its state banks has actually increased in recent years as a consequence of the financial crisis (62% in 2010). 6 These reforms included the divestiture of state shares in several joint venture banks and the privatization of Bank of Alexandria.
Foreign banks have increased their average market share in the non-GCC region ( Figure 4 and Table 1 ), while decreasing slightly in the GCC region. In the case of the GCC, the decline was relatively modest (from 25% in 2001 to 18% in 2010) and offset by an increase in the market share of private domestic banks (to yield a relatively stable average share of private banks). However, the expansion of foreign banks was more significant in the non-GCC region, especially in recent years. The share grew from 8% in 2001 to 21% in 2010, which is almost double the share in 2005. There are also some interesting patterns in the two sub-sets of non-GCC countries that are worth highlighting. As shown in Table 1 , the share of private banks in the first group of countries (i.e. countries where private banks lead) increased initially because of the expansion of domestic banks, but since 2005 foreign banks have expanded at a faster pace. These foreign banks represented 22% of the system in 2010 and are mostly international banks with headquarters outside the region, as opposed to regional banks. By contrast, the expansion of foreign banks in the second group of countries (i.e. countries where state banks lead) from 1 to 15% of the system in 2001-2010 also accelerated in recent years, but this expansion was primarily driven by regional banks (i.e. banks with headquarters within the region). Figure 5 shows the trend of foreign ownership of banks across countries. Within the GCC region, all countries experienced a decline in the market share of Bank Ownership and Performance in the MENA Region foreign banks in recent years except for Qatar. In the non-GCC region, the share of foreign banks increased in all the countries except for Tunisia where the share declined from 29% in 2001 to 22% in 2010. Countries where foreign banks gained significant ground include Syria and Egypt. Syria, with no foreign banks in 2001, experienced the highest increase in the share of foreign-owned banks which represented 33% of the banking sector by 2010. In Egypt, foreign ownership of the banking sector increased from 7% in 2001 to 31% in 2010. However, the expansion of foreign banks (both regional and international banks) in non-GCC countries has been relatively recent and most of these banks remain individually small. They seem to occupy specific niches and may not yet be able to challenge domestic banks in their main markets.
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There was also a rapid increase in the share of listed banks in both the GCC and the non-GCC regions, as shown in Figure 6 and Table 2 . For example, in all 7 Anzoategui, Martinez Peria, and Rocha (2010) show that bank competition in MENA is still weaker than in other regions. This may reflect a variety of factors, including lack of critical mass of private banks in some countries (including foreign banks), poor financial infrastructure resulting in weak access of smaller private banks to credit information (including foreign banks), and lack of competition from non-banking institutions and markets.
non-GCC countries, listed banks accounted for 56% of assets in 2010 compared to 29% in 2001. Some banks decided to list for strategic considerations, including the need to access external funding in order to sustain high credit growth, while in other countries this trend was due to regulatory requirements. In Syria, for example, all new private banks have been required to list, and this explains the rapid increase of listed private banks in the group of countries with state-led banking systems. The increase in the share of listed banks in MENA should be regarded as a positive development. Listed banks are usually subject to stricter corporate governance rules and disclosure requirements and are in principle subject to closer scrutiny by market participants. The extent to which these outcomes materialize depends on the quality of governance rules and disclosure requirements, their enforcement by regulators, and effective monitoring by capital market institutions. Interestingly, there was also a modest increase in the number and market share of listed public banks during this period.
Data and methodology
We adopt a comprehensive, bank-level empirical analysis to assess the association between bank ownership and performance in nine non-GCC MENA countries. 8 In doing so, we adopt a bank-level multivariate panel regression analysis in which we analyze ownership while simultaneously controlling for various bank characteristics. For our regressions, we employ ordinary least squares (OLS) on pooled annual bank data for the period 2001-2008. Throughout our regressions, we also include country-and time-fixed effects to mitigate omitted variable bias. By introducing these fixed effects, we aim to control for general country conditions to which the banks are exposed throughout the sample years. 9 We also relax the independency and homoskedasticity assumptions that are required by OLS by reporting three standard error variations: (1) Huber/White robust standard errors and robust standard errors corrected for possible intra-group correlation for which we consider (2) a bank-level or (3) a country-level grouping of bank-year observations.
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8 While the analysis of trends in the structure of banking systems covered the whole MENA region, the statistical analysis focuses on the nine countries in non-GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) area: Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Libya, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, Syria, and Yemen. We focus the statistical analysis on the non-GCC countries, because the distinctions between public and private ownerships are more relevant and consequential in these countries (the stronger interlocking ownership structures in the GCC tend to blur these differences).
9 We also conduct weighted regressions to take into account the possibility that results could be driven by countries that have a larger number of banks. In the analysis, each bank-year observation carries a weight that is inversely proportional to the number of banks in its banking system in that particular year. The results for state ownership and performance obtained from weighted regressions are very similar and, thus, are not reported. 10 Results for country-level groupings are not reported but are available from the authors upon request.
Our balance sheet and income statement data are taken from Fitch's Bankscope database and include unconsolidated statements of commercial banks in MENA. The sample roughly comprises 600 bank-year observations of about 120 banks in nine countries for the period [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] . As noted before, our sample consists of banks in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, Syria, and Yemen. Table 3 provides an overview of variable definitions and their sources. Table 4 shows pairwise correlations. Notes: *Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%.
Bank Ownership and Performance in the MENA Region
Our main dependent variables can be grouped into four clusters. First, we consider general profitability and interest-related factors. We investigate the standard profitability indicators return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). We use the net-interest margin (NIM) to investigate the interest-related side of the business, where NIM is defined as net-interest income as a fraction of total assets. We further investigate NIM by dissecting this variable into its two drivers -interest income to assets and interest costs to assets. Second, we explore efficiency variables. To capture bank efficiency, we use the ratios of total Overhead Costs to Assets and Personnel Costs to Assets. Further, we break the two cost ratios between the underlying quantities and prices by computing the number of Employees per unit of Asset and the related average wages.
Third, we study asset allocation to understand how banks allocate their resources between lending and non-lending activities. We use the securities to assets ratio which encapsulates many types of securities but is mostly driven by government securities. As such this ratio also measures private sector crowding out effects to some extent.
Fourth, we examine asset quality and its impact on profitability. Aggregate country-level data show that countries that have a large share of state banks also have a high ratio of NPLs to total loans ( Figure 6 ). Ideally, we would use this indicator as a measure of asset quality, but we could not obtain sufficient banklevel data on NPLs, especially for state banks, due to deficiencies in financial disclosure. In order to capture differences in asset quality and its impact on profitability, we use the ratio of loan-loss provisions to gross loans. This indicator captures the extent to which banks' loan portfolios are being contaminated by NPLs and having an adverse impact on profitability.
Our explanatory variables include ownership variables which we compiled using a variety of sources including Bankscope, Bankers' Almanac, and individual bank websites.
11 We classify equity holders as being either public or private, or domestic or foreign). Our public ownership dummy assumes a value of 1 if the bank is majority government owned and 0 otherwise. Similarly, our foreign ownership dummy has a value 1 if the private bank is majority foreign owned and 0 otherwise. We do not differentiate between foreign banks (i.e. regional versus international banks) because of small samples. By conducting the banks' and exchange website searches, we also 11 The authors spent substantial amount of time and effort in collecting data on ownership structure of banks. Besides exploring different databases on banks and websites of respective banks, our other two sources of information include database compiled and shared with us by Union of Arab Banks and numerous discussions with country economists at the World Bank who either provided or verified banks ownership structures. created a listed dummy variable that assumes a value of 1 if the bank is listed on a stock exchange and 0 otherwise. Finally, in line with other empirical studies, we also include a number of other bank-level variables as controls, including total assets, the ratio of noninterest income to total assets, and the ratios of deposits to assets and loans to assets. Total assets, which capture the absolute size of a bank, control for operational cost differences due to economies of scale, funding cost differences due to extensive branch networks and public perceptions of greater safety, and the greater ability of larger banks to diversify (Berger 1995 On the other hand, the ratio of deposits to assets, which is higher for retail banks, differentiates banks on the basis of the markets in which they operate (retail versus wholesale). The ratio of loans to total assets differentiates banks on the basis of their investment portfolios (lending versus non-lending activities).
Empirical results
In this section, we summarize results from our regression analysis on a sample of annual bank observations in nine non-GCC MENA countries for the period 2001-2008. 12 Tables 5 and 6 reports the main results.
Our main independent variables of interest are a set of dummies: public, foreign, and listed. By including these dummies simultaneously, their regression coefficients need to be interpreted relative to the reference group of private, domestic, and non-listed banks. To account for confounding factors, we also include the following bank-level, time-varying controls. As a measure of bank size, we use the 1-period lag of the log of total assets. To distinguish between the different strategies on income-generating activities of banks, we also include the non-interest income to total assets. In line with other empirical studies, to control for different asset and funding management approaches, we use the deposit to assets and loan to assets ratios. In addition to bank-level controls, we also include time and country dummies to capture the general regional trends and country-specific time-invariant conditions.
Since the main objective of the article is to examine the impact of ownership on performance, we focus on the rows when analyzing the different regression results (e.g. we analyze the results for the state bank dummy in different regressions). However, we also highlight important results in each column (i.e. in the same regression), as we examine the results. 
State bank ownership and performance
Regressions 1 and 2 in Table 5 confirm that state banks are on average less profitable than private domestic, non-listed banks. The finding is statistically significant, after controlling for bank size and balance sheet structures. The ROA (Micco, Panizza, and Yañez 2004) as well as MENA-specific research (Kobeissi and Sun 2010) . Note that these are strong results, as they show that state banks are significantly less profitable than the least profitable segment of private banks (i.e., domestic and non-listed banks), controlling for size and other factors. Regression 3 shows that state banks generate smaller net-interest margins vis-à-vis private domestic banks, although the coefficient is small and not significant. State banks do not have different interest income and expense ratios either, after controlling for size and other factors. We confirm through regressions 6 and 7 that state banks in MENA tend to hold larger portfolios of government securities after controlling for size and balance sheet structures. This probably reflects a mandate for state banks to participate in government debt auctions and contribute to debt finance, regardless of their size and structure of funding. Intriguingly, this asset structure does not seem to have a major negative impact on interest margins, but it is possible that this result is partly due to accrual of interest on NPLs, as noted before.
Regressions 8 and 9 in Table 6 confirm that state banks have higher cost ratios after controlling for their larger size, which helps explain their lower profitability. Moreover, regressions 10-12 confirm that their higher cost ratios are generated by much higher ratios of employment to assets, and not by higher wages. In fact, state banks pay considerably lower wages to their employees, relative to their private counterparts, a result that reflects their lower skills base as noted before. These results show that state banks are not able to exploit effectively their scale economies. The coefficients of the scale variable across different regressions show that larger banks tend to have significantly lower ratios of employees to assets and lower cost ratios, despite paying significantly higher wages. This suggests the existence of substantive scale economies that ultimately contribute to higher returns on equity for larger banks. However, for state banks this is offset by a large employment base that contributes to higher cost ratios and lower profitability.
Finally, regression 13 confirms that state banks tend to have significantly higher ratios of loan-loss provisions to gross loans. This bank-level result is, therefore, consistent with country-level data showing that countries where state banks command a larger market share tend to have higher aggregate NPL ratios ( Figure 6 ). The need to provision for larger losses in their loan portfolios probably reflects a larger share of lending to state enterprises as well as lending to favored sectors, relative to private banks, combined with limited capacity to manage the associated risks. Together with the larger operating costs, this result also helps explain the lower profit ratios of state banks. Section 6 provides further discussion on the possible impact of policy mandates on the performance of state banks.
Foreign bank ownership and performance
Regressions 1 and 2 show that foreign banks are slightly more profitable than private domestic banks, a result that has been previously documented for developing countries as well (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga 2000; Micco, Panizza, and Yañez 2004; Kobeissi and Sun 2010) . However, the dummy coefficients are not statistically significantly in our sample. As noted before, this could be due to sample differences -we do not include countries such as Iran, Israel, and Turkey, and foreign bank presence is a relatively recent phenomenon in our sample. Thus, our tests could simply fail due to lack of statistical power.
The lack of statistical power may be affecting other results as well. As shown in regression 3, foreign banks generate higher interest margins, but the differences vis-à-vis the reference group are not significant. Intriguingly, they do not generate more interest income despite holding a smaller portfolio of government securities (regressions 4-7). However, they benefit from lower funding costs. Also, they have higher ratios of employment to assets and higher cost ratios, even after controlling for their smaller size (regressions 8-11). Note also that they have higher cost ratios despite paying wages which are slightly lower than those paid by private domestic banks (regressions 12 and 13 and Section 4). 13 These results would suggest lower levels of cost efficiency for foreign banks, which is intriguing considering previous research. Again, these results could simply reflect lack of statistical power and suggest that it is premature to test the impact of foreign ownership on bank performance in non-GCC countries: most foreign banks are still very small, are developing their market strategies, and have not yet been able to penetrate the main credit markets. Moreover, the weak financial infrastructure of many non-GCC countries (including weak credit reporting systems) deprives these small foreign banks from essential credit information and prevents a more rapid expansion into potentially profitable areas such as retail lending and SME finance.
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Bank listing and performance
Regressions 1 and 2 also show that listed banks are significantly more profitable, 15 controlling for size and balance sheet structures. The ROA and ROE coefficients are 0.269 and 3.654% higher for listed banks, respectively. Kobeissi and Sun (2010) find qualitatively similar results as well. Listed banks tend to generate higher net-interest margins, due to lower interest expenses and higher interest income relative to total assets. The lower funding costs could reflect a lower risk premium, as these banks are subject to stricter governance and disclosure requirements and closer market scrutiny. The lower ratio of government securities to assets probably contributes to higher interest income and higher interest margins. All the coefficients have the expected signs and form a coherent picture, although we also note that some of these coefficients are not statistically significant. Regressions 8-12 also show that listed banks tend to have higher cost ratios due essentially to higher wages, although some of these results are not statistically significant. However, the higher costs are more than offset by higher net-interest margins and higher not-interest income (Section 4), resulting ultimately in higher profitability. Indeed, the higher wages paid by listed banks could simply reflect a more skilled labor force, required to develop more sophisticated and profitable lines of business. The higher profit ratios suggest that this strategy has paid off. Finally, we note that listed banks have lower ratios of loan-loss provisions to loans, although the coefficient is not significant.
All in all, these results imply that listing is associated with higher costs but that these costs are more than compensated by higher revenues and profits. As 14 Maddedu (2010) and de la Campa (2011) examine the quality of credit information systems and collateral regimes in MENA and show that the region lags most other regions in the quality of financial infrastructure. Anzoategui, Martinez Peria, and Rocha (2010) show that MENA banking systems seem less competitive than banking systems in most other regions and that this is probably due not only to bank regulations but also to weak financial infrastructure and less competition from non-banking sectors. 15 We do not make strong claims of causality, since more profitable banks might find it more attractive to list. noted before, the stricter governance and disclosure requirements imposed on listed banks could be driving these results. This interpretation is consistent with a recent survey of bank governance in MENA (OECD 2009), which concludes that corporate governance of non-listed banks is generally poor, particularly those that are family controlled -these banks tend to engage heavily in connected lending and perform poorly as a result. This would suggest that MENA regulators should encourage or even mandate listing, as some countries already do. However, there is also a possibility that our results could be affected by selection bias: better managed and more successful banks may be precisely those banks that decide to list.
Bank structures and performance
Finally, we complement the analysis of ownership and performance by focusing briefly on the impact of size and balance sheet structures on performance. We note that larger banks tend to be more profitable, as indicated by higher returns on assets and equity, although only the latter variable is statistically significant. Larger banks tend to have lower ratios of interest income to assets and lower net-interest margins, results that are consistent with their larger securities portfolios, although most of the relevant coefficients are not statistically significant. Most importantly, larger banks have lower cost ratios, despite paying higher wages on average. This result is essentially due to a lower ratio of employees to assets, reflecting scale economies. These results are all statistically significant and help explain their higher profitability.
Banks which generate higher non-interest income tend to have lower netinterest margins (as they focus on particular markets) and higher cost ratios but are still able to drive higher profitability. The higher cost ratios are due to both higher wages and higher ratios of employees to assets. The higher wages probably reflect the need for higher-skilled staff to develop more sophisticated lines of business that generate substantial revenues from fees and commissions. The higher ratio of employees to assets is not necessarily a sign of operational inefficiency but rather reflects that non-interest business lines are relatively labor-intensive.
Banks that have higher ratios of deposits to liabilities tend to have higher interest expenses and smaller margins, controlling for size. This result could simply reflect the fact that banks have to pay higher interest rates to attract more deposits, holding constant their size (and branch network). In general, changes in the ratio of deposits to liabilities by themselves do not seem to have significant effects on cost ratios or consistent effects on profitability (the impact on ROA is negative while the impact on ROE is positive, although not significant), holding constant bank size and ownership structures.
Finally, we find that banks with larger loan portfolios have lower profitability, controlling for size and other characteristics. This result is not driven by differences in margins -although banks with larger loan portfolios generate more interest revenue, they also need to pay more to attract funding. The lower profitability could be explained by the larger costs required to sustain large loan portfolios, again controlling for size. Intriguingly, the higher ratio of loans to assets is associated with lower provisioning ratios. The latter could be due to lower concentration and higher diversification effects in their loan books, although the result is admittedly surprising.
6 Is the weaker performance of state banks justified by their policy mandates?
Previous sections showed that the financial performance of state banks is substantially weaker than that of private banks. Among others, they exhibit lower profitability, higher costs, and weaker asset quality, controlling for their larger size and balance sheet structures. The question is whether these weaker results could be explained or even justified by their development mandates. First, we consider the mandate to expand access to households, particularly in remote areas. State banks in MENA tend to have larger branch networks and are generally more present in remote areas where business volumes might be too small for private banks to justify large fixed costs. State bank expansion in these areas could, therefore, help explain their higher ratios of employees and overhead costs over assets. Yet, we do not find evidence that a larger share of stateowned banks in the banking system is positively associated with increased access to finance. Regression 1 in Appendix A displays a panel regression based on data for eight MENA countries that shows the number of deposit accounts per adult is even negatively associated with the share of state bank assets as a percentage of total bank assets. Regression 2 shows that this negative association persists after controlling for differences in GDP per capita and the degree of urbanization. Regression 3 documents that also once the number of bank branches per adult is controlled for, the association is still negative (and no longer statistically significant). In theory, a reverse causality argument in which countries with high access have no need for state bank presence could perhaps help explain the negative association. Regardless, the absence of a robust, positive relationship casts doubt over the assertion that state banks actively promote household access. Although this analysis does not account for the contribution of specialized institutions such as postal and agricultural banks, the results suggest that the large staff of state commercial banks is probably due to outdated technologies and labor redundancies (possibly reflecting the political constraints to reduce the size of their staff), rather than a wellarticulated strategy to promote access in remote areas. 16 Second, state banks might be better at promoting SME finance. Indeed, there is evidence that state banks have contributed in this area, although they do not seem to have developed the capacity to manage the associated risks. As shown in , the average share of SME lending of state banks is similar to that of private banks (about 10% of the loan portfolio). Moreover, state banks seem to have taken more risks in this area than private banks -they are less selective in their strategies to target SMEs, have a lower ratio of collateralized loans to SMEs and a higher share of investment loans in total SME lending. However, state banks do not seem to have the capacity to manage the associated risks -a lower share of state banks has dedicated SME units, makes use of credit scoring and conducts stress tests. 17 This lack of risk management capacity reflects a lower skills base (consistent with their lower wages) and has probably contributed to the poor financial results mentioned above, including higher NPLs (Figure 7 ), higher levels of loan-loss provisioning, and ultimately lower profitability. Third, there is no compelling evidence that state banks in non-GCC countries played a significant countercyclical role in the recent financial crisis. The potential scope for countercyclical lending would seem important in countries like Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia, where private banks lead financial intermediation, but public banks still retain an important market share and would have the means to mitigate an excessive contraction of credit. However, there is no clear evidence that state banks in these three countries played this role during the crisis. As shown in Appendix B, in Egypt and Tunisia, state banks lost market share, as their credits grew at lower rates than those of private banks in 2010. In Morocco, state banks achieved a modest gain in market share until 2009, but experienced a significant decline in market share in 2010. Moreover, the modest gain in market share in 2009 can hardly be interpreted as a countercyclical measure, as their credit growth rates also declined significantly in the same year.
Summary of findings and policy implications 7.1 Main findings
Our main objective in this article was to examine recent trends in bank ownership in the Middle East and North African region and the impact of bank ownership on bank performance. We also examine the impact of bank listing on performance. We analyze these relationships while controlling for bank size and balance sheet structures.
We show that the average market share of state banks remained low and stable in the GCC region (around 28% of total assets) but declined considerably in the non-GCC region, from 56% of total assets in 2001 to 39% in 2010. State banks lost market share in most non-GCC countries, but there is a group of countries where they still dominate financial intermediation (Algeria, Libya, and The market share of foreign banks declined slightly in the GCC region, from 25 to 18% of total assets between 2001 and 2010. By contrast, the market share of foreign banks increased significantly in the non-GCC region, from 8% in 2001 to 21% in 2010. However, most of this increase in market shares in the non-GCC region took place in recent years and was due mostly to entry of new foreign banks rather than the expansion of existing foreign banks. Thus, foreign banks remain relatively small in many countries and do not seem to have penetrated the main domestic credit markets to any significant extent.
The market share of listed banks increased in both the GCC and the non-GCC regions. In the GCC, it is already very high at 93% of total assets. In the non-GCC region, the share of listed banks increased significantly, from 29 to 56% of total banking assets. The bulk of listed banks are private banks, but a small number of public banks were also listed in this period.
Regarding the main statistical findings, in line with research in other regions we find that state banks are significantly less profitable than private banks in the non-GCC region. This result seems to be due to a combination of policy mandates and operational inefficiencies. First, they finance more the government than the private banks, a result which may reflect a government financing mandate and that contributes to lower net-interest margins. Second, they have much higher ratios of operating costs to assets controlling for their size and balance sheet structures. This result is primarily due to a much higher ratio of employees to total assets which cannot be explained by success in fulfilling an access mandate. Instead, state banks have not contributed to greater bank penetration in remote areas, and their large employment base probably reflects outdated banking technologies and restrictions to fire excessive staff. Finally, state banks tend to generate much larger NPLs, which translate into larger loanloss provisions and lower profitability. These results may reflect the imposition of various development mandates on state banks, such as the provision of finance to SMEs. These development mandates themselves may be justified, but they have not been fulfilled effectively, due to political interference, lack of risk management capacity, or both.
Foreign banks have slightly higher interest margins and profit ratios relative to private domestic banks, but the differences are not significant. They have higher cost ratios and higher ratios of employees to assets, even controlling for their much smaller size. They seem to be able to offset these higher costs through higher interest and non-interest income, although many of these results are not statistically significant. Moreover, we note that the entry and expansion of foreign banks is a recent phenomenon in many non-GCC countries. Most of these banks remain small and apparently unable to challenge the domestic banks in their main credit markets, due to the absence of either a branch network or a weak financial infrastructure (especially weak credit reporting systems). We note that it is probably premature to test the impact of foreign ownership on bank performance in most non-GCC countries.
We also find that listed banks are more profitable than non-listed banks, controlling for their smaller size and balance sheet structures. Listed banks tend to finance less the government, generate higher net-interest margins, and also generate more revenue from fees and commissions. They have higher cost ratios due essentially to higher wages. This implies that they recruit and maintain a more skilled workforce, required to develop more sophisticated and profitable business lines. Therefore, they have higher cost ratios, but this is more than compensated by larger revenues and profits. They also tend to have lower ratios of loan-loss provisions, which reflect better credit allocation policies and asset quality, and contribute to their profitability. Listed banks are subject to stricter corporate governance and disclosure requirements, and these factors could be driving their better performance. These results are consistent with a recent survey of bank governance in MENA (OECD 2009 ) that reports the poor corporate governance of family-owned banks, especially non-listed banks, and stresses the extent of lending to close relatives and other connected parties that ultimately results in their poor financial performance.
Policy implications 18
As mentioned in the introductory sections of this article, the arguments that have been put forward to justify the continuing presence of state banks include market failures resulting from asymmetric information and poor enforcement of contracts that restrict access to credit; the provision of essential financial services in remote areas (where supply may be restricted by large fixed costs); and the provision of countercyclical finance to prevent an excessive contraction of credit during a financial crisis.
These arguments may justify the presence of state banks in some MENA countries. In particular, the weak financial infrastructure in MENA (weak credit reporting systems, weak creditor rights) is a major factor hindering access to finance in the region and provides a rationale for policy interventions, including partial credit guarantees and the use of state banks (Rocha, Arvai, and Farazi 2011) . Ideally, these institutional and legal weaknesses should be addressed head on, and policy interventions should become more targeted and limited in volume, but in some countries it may take time to correct these deficiencies, due to technical limitations, political limitations, or both. During this period, state banks may make a contribution to access in areas such as SME finance, housing finance, infrastructure, and agriculture.
At the same time, this article shows that state bank interventions may come with a significant cost. These banks are much less profitable than private banks, due inter alia to more government financing, excessive employment, larger costs, and lower asset quality. The profitability of state banks may actually be inflated by interest accrual on NPLs and underprovisioning. Therefore, the differences in profitability may be even larger. In some cases, the accumulated losses may result in the insolvency of these institutions and a large bill for taxpayers. Some of these deficiencies are the result of the mandates themselves, while some of them result from excessive political interference and the poor governance structures and operational deficiencies of these banks. The question that arises is how the potential benefits of state bank interventions can be maximized and the potential costs minimized. The answer to this question needs to be highly tailored to individual country conditions. There seems to be scope for reducing the market share of state banks in the countries where they still hold very large shares and dominate financial intermediation, i.e. Algeria, Libya, and Syria. The main policy objectives that may justify the presence of state banks can be met with fewer state banks holding a lower market share. Moreover, these objectives can probably be met more effectively under these conditions, as these banks would operate in a more transparent and competitive environment. Furthermore, it is easier to clarify policy mandates and monitor the performance of state banks when they are fewer in number, and there is a critical mass of private banks providing a benchmark for performance in all the main credit markets. Note in this regard that Syria has been making reasonable progress in reducing the share of state banks through entry of new private banks, although the restructuring of the existing state banks remains a challenge.
There is also scope for clarifying the mandates, improving the governance structures, and strengthening the operational efficiency of most if not all state banks in MENA. Achieving these results and sustaining them over time is not a trivial task but should remain a key objective for MENA policy-makers, if there is a decision to preserve a role for these banks. 19 Although state banks may not be able to achieve the same levels of profitability of private banks due to their policy mandates, the results in this article suggest that these banks could meet their main development mandates more effectively if they were allowed to operate independently and able to reduce the excessive employment of lowskilled personnel and recruit better trained staff, able to implement better lending and risk management technologies. MENA countries that do not have state banks may not find it necessary to create new ones, because they have been addressing their policy objectives through alternative and probably more effective policy interventions. For example, Lebanon does not have state banks but has achieved a relatively high share of SME lending by MENA standards through the use of partial credit guarantee schemes. 20 Note that these schemes have also played a countercyclical role in many countries within and outside MENA, and this is one of the arguments that have been put forward to justify the presence of state banks. 21 Lastly, we note that credit guarantee schemes may also be a preferable form of policy intervention, because they provide an easier exit mechanism. Foreign banks in MENA remain generally small but would probably expand faster and contribute to more competitive and efficient financial systems if they had access to more and better credit information. As noted above and in other studies, addressing the weakness on credit reporting systems should remain one of the key items in the financial development agenda of MENA countries. This would entail both upgrading public credit registries and, especially, introducing private credit bureaus able to expand coverage and improve the depth of credit information.
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Listed banks have performed better than non-listed banks, and this may be due to the stricter governance standards and disclosure requirements imposed on these banks. Introducing listing obligations for all licensed banks may be one option to improve the performance of family-owned and non-listed banks, although the same outcome may be achieved by the bank regulator by simply imposing and enforcing the higher governance standards and disclosure requirements on all banks, listed 19 Rudolph (2009) and Scott (2007) review the experience of well-managed state banks and the legal structures and safeguards that must be put in place to ensure a reasonable operational and financial performances. 20 Rocha et al. (2010) . 21 IFC (2010) provides some evidence of the use of credit guarantee schemes for countercyclical purposes. 22 Maddedu (2010) and Anzoategui, Martinez Peria, and Rocha (2010) . and non-listed. 23 In this regard, an interesting question is whether the listing of public banks could contribute to improvements in their performance. Unfortunately, the listing of MENA public banks is very recent and the sample too small to enable statistical testing, but this measure would probably only make sense in the context of a much broader package of reforms changing their markets shares, roles, mandates, and governance structures.
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Appendix A: government ownership of banking sector and access to finance 1 2 3
Deposit accounts per 1,000 adults 24 We included an interactive dummy for public and listed banks, and the results indicated that public listed banks perform better than non-listed ones. However, this result probably lacks statistical power due to very small sample of public listed banks and the short period of listing and could simply reflect a selection bias -the public banks that were listed were the best performing.
